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Summary
We consider an optimal nonlinear income tax problem in a
model with search-matching unemployment and where the
negotiated pre-tax wage decreases with marginal tax rate
but increases with the level of tax. By omitting labor supply
Responses, assuming no benefit for the unemployed and an
efficient allocation in the absence of tax, we characterize
the optimal equity-efficiency trade off. We show that in
labor market specific to each interior level of skill, optimal
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wages and unemployment rates are distorted downwards.
Moreover, average tax rate are increasing along the income
distribution and marginal tax rate are positive at the top,
even when the skill distribution is bonded.
Résumé
Dans cet article, nous nous intéressons à la détermination
d’un barème fiscal non-linéaire optimal dans un modèle où
des frictions de recherche engendrent du chômage et où
les salaires négociés diminuent avec les taux marginaux
et augmentent avec les niveaux de taxes. En négligeant
les réponses de l’offre de travail, en supposant l’absence
d’allocation pour les chômeurs et en supposant que l’al-
location des ressources est efficace en l’absence de taxes,
nous sommes à même de proposer le meilleur compromis
entre équité et efficacité. Nous montrons que pour chaque
marché du travail correspondant à un niveau de producti-
vité intérieur, la redistribution optimale s’accompagne d’une
distorsion des salaires et des taux de chômage vers le bas.
Nous montrons également que le barème fiscal optimal se
caractérise par des taux moyens de taxation qui augmentent
avec les salaires et que le taux marginal de taxation en haut
est toujours positif, même en présence d’une distribution
bornée.
Keywords: Optimal Income Taxation, Unemployment, Wage Bargai-
ning, Matching.
Mots-clés : Taxation optimale des revenus, chômage, négociations
salariales, appariement.
J.E.L. : D82, H21, H24, J64
1. Introduction
Since Mirrlees (1971), the theory of optimal income taxation considers the
design of the optimal redistributive policy when the government cannot condition
taxes on (exogenous) skills but only on (endogenous) earnings. The theory considers
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perfect frictionless labor markets, and ignores in particular the possible emergence
of (involuntary) unemployment. 1 However, many studies emphasize the deep
impact of labor market taxation on employment (e.g. Prescott (2004), Rogerson
(2006)) and more specifically on unemployment (Daveri and Tabellini (2000) and
Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel (2005)). Moreover, unemployment, and not only low
ability, is an important source of poverty. A more comprehensive theory of optimal
redistribution should thus be developed in an environment where unemployment
is a genuine phenomenon affected by taxation.
In labor market models that take unemployment into account, the level of
employment is determined by labor demand, which is a decreasing function of the
pre-tax wage. In a non-competitive wage-setting and when the intensive margin
(the hours-of-work decision) of labor supply is omitted, a change in tax policy
that increases the marginal tax rate without affecting the level of the tax reduces
the pre-tax wage, thereby increasing labor demand and reducing unemployment.
This is what we call the wage-cum-labor-demand margin. Intuitively, such a tax
change induces that a given increase in the negotiated post-taxed wage is more
costly for the employers. Consequently, they become more reluctant to concede
workers’ wage claims. On the contrary, a tax change that increases the level of
tax while keeping the marginal tax rate unchanged increases labor cost, thereby
unemployment. These properties have been demonstrated in various theoretical
settings: the monopoly union model (Hersoug, 1984), the right-to manage union
model (Lockwood and Manning, 1993), the matching model (Pissarides, 1998) and
the efficiency wage model (Pisauro, 1991). Empirical evidence that suggests the
importance of these effects has also been put forward in the literature (Manning
(1993), Røed and Strøm (2002) or Sørensen (1997)). The effect of the marginal
tax rate on pre-tax wages obtained in these model is also consistent with the
empirical findings on the elasticity of income with respect to the marginal tax rate
surveyed by Saez et alii (2012). According to them, the most plausible estimates
for the elasticity of earnings to one minus the marginal tax rate range from 0.12
to 0.4 in the U.S. Whether this elasticity is due to a labor supply response (as in
a Mirrleesian model) or to a non-competitive wage setting response has to our
knowledge, not been investigated yet, and remains an open empirical issue.
Boone and Bovenberg (2004) separate unemployment from non-participation
in an optimal redistributive taxation framework where the government does not
observe the skill level of the agents. However the unemployment risk does not
depend neither on wages nor on taxation in their model. Engström (2009) extends
the Stiglitz (1982) two-skill model of optimal taxation by introducing search unem-
ployment, but with exogenous hourly wages. Three recent papers (Hungerbühler
1. Many international institutions (such as the ILO or the OECD) distinguish among non-employed
individuals the unemployed who search for a job from those out-of-the-labor-force.
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et alii (2006, henceforth HLPV), Hungerbühler and Lehmann (2009, henceforth
HL) and Lehmann et alii (2011, henceforth LPV) propose a theory of optimal
redistributive taxation with an endogenous risk of being unemployed. In these
models, the deadweight losses of redistributive taxation are due to responses along
the wage-cum-labor-demand margin and not along the intensive labor supply
margin. The present article proposes a canonical model of optimal redistribution
with unemployment. This model, which is exposed in the next section, aims at
shedding light on the different mechanisms at work. We ignore participation
decisions and welfare benefits, these simplifications being the main contribution
of the present paper compared to HLPV, HL and LPV. This Section also emphasizes
the methodological differences and analogies between our simple model and a
version of the Mirrlees model that generates the same responses of pre-tax earnings
to taxation. The concluding section discusses the influence of our simplifying
assumptions on the results and spells out the relationship of our canonical model
to HLPV, HL and LPV.
2. The canonical model
2.1. Environment
We consider an economy where risk-neutral individuals are endowed with
different skill (ability) levels denoted a. The exogenous skill distribution is given
by the continuous density function f (a), defined on the support [a0,a1], with
0 < a0 < a1 ≤ +∞. The size of the population is normalized to 1. Jobs are skill-
specific. A worker of skill a produces a units of output if and only if she is
employed in a type-a job, otherwise her production is nil. This assumption of
perfect segmentation is made for tractability and seems more realistic than the
polar one of a unique labor market for all skill levels.
The government observes only whether an individual is employed or not, and
if she is, at which wage. The government in particular does not observe skills nor
the recruiting processes. Hence, taxation is only a function of wages. A worker of
skill a gets a (pre-tax) wage wa and a disposable income ca =wa –T (wa) if she is
employed. Otherwise, she has no income.
On skill-a labor market, only a fraction L (a,wa) of the f (a) skill-a individuals
find a job. The function L (., .) summarizes all the ingredients of the labor demand
behavior needed for our optimal tax theory. The matching unemployment theory of
Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) and Pissarides (2000) provides micro-foundations
for this function. Matching frictions imply that not all individuals find a job
and not all firms find a worker. A zero-profit condition determines the number
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of vacancies created by firms, thereby the labor demand function L (., .) on each
skill-specific labor market. Firms create vacancies until the cost of creating an
additional vacancy is lower than the expected gain of filling it. As firms open more
vacant jobs, congestion externalities decrease the probability for each vacancy to
be filled, thereby the expected profit per vacancy. When wages decrease on skill-a
labor market, filling a job generates higher profits and firms create more vacancies.
Lemma 1 in LPV shows that it is equivalent to specify a labor demand function
L (., .) or to specify the underlying matching environment. Using this equivalence,
we specify here the assumptions of the model in terms of the function L (., .).
Assumption 2.1 – L (., .) is defined for skill levels a ∈ [a0,a1] and for wages
w ∈ [0,a], takes values within [0,1) and satisfies the following conditions:
i) L (., .) is decreasing in wages w.
ii) L (., .) is increasing in skill a.
iii) The wage elasticity ∂ logL (a,w)/∂ logw is decreasing in wages.
iv) The wage elasticity ∂ logL (a,w)/∂ logw is increasing in skill.
Part i) states that employment is decreasing in wages w. According to Part
ii), more productive workers find a job more easily for a given wage level. Part
iii) and iv) imply that employment is more sensitive to wage changes (in terms of
elasticity) at high wages and at low productivity levels. These assumptions on L (., .)
are not very restrictive and might seem quite natural. They allow a wide range of
functions, for instance the linear employment function L (a,wa) =
a–wa
a
.
We next describe wage setting. On each skill-specific labor market, we assume
that the wage maximizes the“wage-setting objective”
U (c,w,a)
def
≡ c ·L (a,w) (1)
Thus,
wa = argmax
w
(w–T (w)) ·L (a,w) (2)
The wage-setting objectiveU (., ., .) is skill-specific, increasing in disposable income
c (an employee’s welfare depends positively on the after-tax wage) and decreasing
in the pre-tax wage w (a higher pre-tax wage reduces firms’ profit and thus labor
demand). Various microfoundations can justify the functional specification of this
wage-setting objective. As in Mirrlees, we focus on redistribution and consider
a setting such that the role of taxation is only to redistribute income and not to
restore efficiency (see section 3.3 and HL for a case where the no-tax economy is
inefficient). To obtain this property, the matching literature typically assumes that
wages are the outcome of a Nash bargain and that the workers’ bargaining power
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satisfies the so-called Hosios (1990) condition. 2 Alternatively, the Competitive
Search Equilibrium of Moen (1997) leads also to (2) when search is directed by
wages and by skill. Still another possibility is to assume that a skill-specific
utilitarian monopoly union selects the wage wa before firms decide about vacancy
creation (see Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999).
The first-order condition of (2) writes
–
∂ logL
∂ logw
(a,wa) = η (wa) (3)
where
η (w)
def
≡
1–T ′ (w)
1 – T (w)
w
=
∂ log (w–T (w))
∂ logw
(4)
When the pre-tax wage increases by one percent, the term ∂ logL/∂ logw measures
the relative decrease in employment, while η (w) measures the relative increase in
disposable income. At equilibrium, Equation (3) requires that these two relative
changes cancel each other out. The elasticity η (w) of disposable income with
respect to the pre-tax wage summarizes how the tax system affects the equilibrium
wage. 3 A decrease in η (wa), either due to a higher marginal tax rate or to a lower
average tax rate, induces that a given increase in the pre-tax wage leads to a
smaller increase in disposable income. Higher employment probability is then
substituted for lower disposable income in the wage-setting process and so the
pre-tax wage decreases.
We finally describe the government’s budget constraint. Each of the L (a,wa) ·
f (a) employed workers of skill a pays an amount wa – ca of taxes. Let
Ua
def
≡ max
w
U (w–T (w) ,w,a) ≡ (w–T (w)) ·L (a,w) (5)
be the value of the maximized wage-setting objective for workers of skill a. Hence,
Ua = ca ·L (a,wa) and the government’s budget constraint
4 writes∫ a1
a0
[wa ·L (a,wa) –Ua] · f (a) ·da = 0 (6)
Given the unemployment uncertainty, individuals of skill a get on average a pre-tax
wage wa ·L (a,wa) and an after-tax income Ua. Multiplying the difference between
the two by the density of workers and taking the sum for all skill levels gives the
government’s aggregate revenue.
2. Under this condition, the bargaining power of workers equals the elasticity of the matching
function with respect to the stock of unemployment.
3. η (w) is the so-called Coefficient of Residual Income Progression.
4. Introducing an exogenous amount of public expenditure does not change the qualitative results
of the model.
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2.2. Comparison with a Mirrleesian environment
In the “frictional” environment described above, the pre-tax wage decreases
with marginal tax rates. This is because the pre-tax wage maximizes a wage-setting
objective that is increasing in disposable income c and decreasing in pre-tax wage
w. The same property holds in a “Mirrleesian” environment characterized by no
frictions on the labor market, an infinitely elastic labor demand and labor supply
responses along the intensive margin. In this classical framework, a higher pre-tax
wage is due to more effort (less leisure). Conversely, a higher disposable income
increases consumption and pushes up utility. Therefore, there exist specifications
of individuals’ preferences in the Mirrleesian environment that induce the same
responses of pre-tax wages to taxation as our frictional environment. Let h denote
working time. An individual of skill a working h earns w = a ·h. Consider then
preferences that are linear in consumption with a multiplicatively separable and
skill-specific utility of leisure v (., .). So, the utility function equals
c · v (a,h)
These preferences can be rewritten as a function of the observables c and w using
w = a ·h:
UM (c,w,a)
def
≡ c ·L (a,w) (7)
where L (a,w)
def
≡ v
(
a, w
a
)
. Equations (1) and (7) have the same form but the economic
interpretation of the function L (., .) is different. In the frictional environment, L (., .)
stands for the probability that an individual of skill a is employed, whereas in the
Mirrleesian environment it captures the utility of leisure. In both environments,
equilibrium wages maximize (w–T (w)) · L (a,w), thereby generating identical re-
sponses of wages to taxation. The different economic interpretation of L (., .) has a
crucial consequence: the deadweight losses of taxation are different. To understand
this difference, define
UMa
def
≡ max
w
UM (w–T (w) ,w,a)
as the value of the wage-setting objective for workers of skill a in the Mirrlesian
environment. Hence, disposable income verifies ca =U
M
a /L (a,wa). Each individual
of skill a pays taxes wa –
(
UMa /L (a,wa)
)
and the government’s budget constraint
writes ∫ a1
a0
[
wa –
UMa
L (a,wa)
]
· f (a) ·da = 0
In this environment, deadweight losses are minimized whenever wages wa
maximize tax revenues per individual of skill a for a given value of the wage-
setting objective. In the Mirrleesian environment, efficiency, i.e. the situation
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where deadweight losses are minimized, requires a zero marginal tax rate. 5
In the frictional environment, a change in wages affects the level of taxes
paid by employed workers, wa –
Ua
L(a,wa)
, exactly as in the Mirrleesian environment.
However, it also affects the fraction of taxpayers L (a,wa). Hence, expected tax
revenues per individual of skill a equal waL (a,wa) – Ua. So, the deadweight
losses associated to taxation are minimized whenever the average pre-tax wage
waL (a,wa) per individual of skill a is maximized. Efficiency therefore requires
that the elasticity η (wa) of disposable income with respect to wages is equal to
1, that is the marginal tax rate is equal to the average tax rate (see Equation (4)).
Consequently, when the average tax rate is positive (negative), the efficient level
of the marginal tax rate is also positive (negative).
2.3. Social optimum
We henceforth only consider the frictional environment. The government
is ready to compensate individuals for their innate heterogeneous ability. To
formalize this idea, we consider a social objective which consists in an increasing
and concave transformation of individuals’ skill-specific expected utility Ua:
Ω =
∫ a1
a0
Φ (Ua) f (a) da (8)
The government maximizes its objective subject to the budget constraint (6) and
the choices made by the agents. The government does not observe the productivity
of each job but only the wage negotiated by each worker-firm pair. Since a
worker-firm pair maximizes the wage-setting objective U (c,w,a) that is increasing
in c, one can apply the Mirrleesian methodology to solve the optimal tax problem.
The taxation principle (Hammond 1979, Rochet 1985 and Guesnerie 1995)
applies. So, the set of allocations induced by a tax system T (.) through the wage-
setting equations (2) corresponds to the set of incentive-compatible allocations
{wa,ca,Ua}a∈[a0,a1] that verify
∀ (a,b) ∈ [a0,a1]
2 U (ca,wa,a) ≥U (cb,wb,a) (9)
This condition expresses that a worker-firm pair of type a chooses the bundle
(wa,ca) designed for her, rather than any other bundle (wb,cb) designed for worker-
firm pairs of any other type b. From Assumption 1 iv), the strict single-crossing
condition holds. Hence, (9) is equivalent to the envelope condition associated to (2)
U˙a =Ua ·
∂ logL
∂a
(a,wa) (10)
5. Formally, the first-order condition of maximizing wa –
Ua
L(a,wa)
in wa for a given Ua writes (using
ca/wa = 1– (T (wa)/wa)):
1
1– Tw
= –
∂ logL
∂ logw (a,wa), which implies T
′ (wa) = 0, given (3) and (4).
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and the monotonicity requirement that the wage wa is a nondecreasing function
of the skill level a. We consider the so-called first-order approach that considers
the“relaxed” problem without the monotonicity constraint. 6
Hence, the government’s problem consists in finding an allocation a 7→ {wa,Ua}
that maximizes the social objective (8) subject to the government’s budget con-
straint (6) and the incentive constraint (10). Taking the wage as the control variable
and the expected utility as the state variable, 7 the optimal tax problem can be
solved using the Hamiltonian
H (w,U ,a,λ,q)
def
≡ {Φ (U ) +λ [w ·L (a,w) –U ]} · f (a) +q ·U ·
∂ logL
∂a
(a,w)
where λ is the multiplier associated to the government’s budget constraint and q is
the co-state variable associated to the incentive constraint. It is convenient to use
Za = –(qa ·Ua)/λ. Then the first-order conditions of the government’s problem are
(10) and
∂ (waL (a,wa))
∂w
· f (a) =
∂2 logL
∂a∂w
(a,wa) ·Za (11a)
–Z˙a =
(
1–
Φ
′ (Ua)
λ
)
·Ua · f (a) (11b)
Za1 = 0 (11c)
Za0 = 0 (11d)
Combining (11b) and (11c) gives
Za =
∫ a1
a
(
1–
Φ
′ (Ut )
λ
)
·Ut · f (t) ·dt (12)
These relations describe the equity-efficiency tradeoff faced by the government.
To see the intuition behind this optimality condition, we focus on the optimization
problem for agents of type a and consider a marginal increase in their wage. The
incentive constraint (10) implies that the value of the wage-setting objective for
workers of skill a, Ua, is predetermined and not affected by the change in the wage
wa.
The left-hand side of Equation (11a) stands for the efficiency part of the trade-
off. An increase in the wage rate wa decreases the probability of being employed,
so the impact on the average pre-tax wage waL (a,wa) per individual of skill a is
ambiguous.
The right-hand side of Equation (11a) represents the impact on informational
rents of a higher pre-tax wage for type-a workers. When jobs of productivity a are
6. Simulations in HLPV and LPV verify that along the solutions of the relaxed problem, wages are
non-decreasing in skills.
7. and making the regularity assumption that the control variable is continuous in skill
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better paid (while keeping Ua fixed), a wage-setter of type t > a finds it profitable
to choose the wage wa designed for type-a jobs instead of the wage wt designed for
her. To prevent this “mimicking”, the value of the wage-setting objective for type-t
jobs has to grow. Using Equation (10), the term in front of Za on the right-hand
side of (11a) measures by how much the rate of change of the skill-specific value
of the wage-setting objective U˙a/Ua has to grow when wa marginally increases.
From Assumption 1 iv), this term is positive.
The incentive-compatibility constraints will remain satisfied if all jobs with
a productivity higher than a benefit from an equivalent relative increase in their
wage-setting objective. For any type t above a, this relative increase times Ut
gives the rise in the wage-setting objective. Each unit of the latter generates an
increase in the social welfare measured by Φ′t and implies a budgetary cost equal
to λ. Aggregating these two terms between a and a1 and dividing by the cost of
public funds gives (12).
The intuition behind Equation (11d) is the following. A unit relative increase of
the wage-setting objective spills over the whole skill distribution and its effect is
proportional to Za0 . At the optimum, this change must have no first-order effect,
so Za0 has to equal zero.
We henceforth use the words “optimal - optimality” to characterize the solution
to the government’s problem. We get the following proposition:
Proposition 2.1 – i) For each a ∈ (a0,a1), optimal wages are below their
efficient levels.
ii) Optimal and efficient wages coincide at both ends of the skill distribution.
Proof 2.1. By Assumption 1 ii) and Equation (10), Ua is increasing in a, and
1– Φ
′(Ua)
λ
is thus also increasing in a. Moreover, from Equations (11c) and (11d), the
mean value theorem ensures the existence of a critical skill level aˆ such that Z˙aˆ = 0,
which by Equation (11b) implies that 1– Φ
′(Uaˆ)
λ
= 0. So, from (11b), Function a 7→ Za
is increasing on [a0, aˆ] and decreasing on [aˆ,a1]. It thus take positive values on
(a0,a1) and is nil at a = a0,a1. Using Equation (11a) and Assumption 1 iii) ends the
proof.
The intuition of Proposition 1 is that the government wants to avoid infor-
mational rents, because those rents benefit to high-skilled jobs. Distorting wages
below their efficient levels is the only way the government can do this. The
optimum trades off the equity gains of reducing informational rents against the
efficiency losses of distorting “optimal” wages below their “efficient” levels. At
both ends of the skill distribution, the equity gain is null, so wages are not distorted.
Proposition 1 implies the three following corollaries.
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Corollary 2.1 – i) For each a ∈ (a0,a1), the optimal probability of being em-
ployed, L (a,wa), is above its efficient level.
ii) Optimal and efficient probabilities of being employed coincide at both ends
of the skill distribution. Aggregate employment is above its efficient level.
This follows directly from Proposition 1 since the skill-specific employment
probability is decreasing in the skill-specific wage (by Assumption 1 i). Finally,
Corollary 2.2 – The average tax rate is increasing along the whole wage
distribution.
Proof 2.2. From the first-order condition (3) of the wage-setting program,
the optimal allocation where wages are below their efficient value can only be
decentralized by implementing a tax schedule such that the elasticity η (w) of
disposable income with respect to wages is below 1. From (4), this implies that for
all wage levels (except for w0 and w1) the marginal tax rate T
′ (w) is above the
average tax rate T (w)/w. Hence the optimal average tax rate is increasing in the
wage.
In other words, the optimal allocation is implemented by a progressive (in the
sense of increasing average tax rates) tax schedule because progressivity reduces
wages below their efficient levels.
Corollary 2.3 – If the skill distribution is bounded, the marginal tax rate is
positive at the top.
Proof 2.3. According to Point ii) of Proposition 1, at the highest skill level, the
optimal wage is efficient. So, from the first-order condition (3) of the wage-setting
program one must have η
(
wa1
)
= 1. From (4), this implies that T ′
(
wa1
)
=
T(wa1 )
wa1
.
Theses rates are positive by the budget constraint (6) and Corollary 2.
3. Extensions
This Section investigates to which extent our canonical model of optimal
redistribution with endogenous unemployment is affected when some assumptions
are relaxed. It builds on the results of HLPV, HL and LPV.
3.1. Assistance benefits
Our simple model postulates that the unemployed get no income. This assump-
tion is not consistent with the fact that the government aims at redistributing to
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the poor. It is therefore necessary to introduce unemployment benefits. However,
as the model is static, the government is unable to infer the type of a jobless
individual from her past earnings. Thus, we focus on an assistance benefit, i.e. a
benefit that is the same for unemployed agents, whatever their skill level. Although
redistribution is made through a high assistance benefit and the surplus of workers
is reduced, the results obtained in the previous section are still valid.
However, the invariance of the results can be explained by the fact that
redistributing through a high assistance benefit has no efficiency effect since
no participation decision is taken into account. HLPV consider an endogenous
participation. For simplicity, they assume that all individuals face the same cost of
participation, whatever their skill level. Consequently, every agent above (below)
an endogenous threshold of skill participates (does not participate). Moreover,
they assume that the government is unable to screen the search activities of the
unemployed. Therefore, the government is constrained to give the same level of
assistance benefit to all non-employed individuals, whatever their skill or their
participation decisions. In this environment, HLPV show that for all participating
types, point i) of Proposition 1 and of Corollary 1, and Corollary 2 still hold. Point
ii) of Proposition 1 and of Corollary 1 do not hold anymore for the lowest skill
a0. This is because they do not participate anymore. The government chooses to
reduce efficiency by pushing down participation because it allows her to reduce
the informational rents given to the more productive worker-firm pairs. Moreover,
in order to reduce participation, in-work benefits (if any) are lower than assistance
benefits.
3.2. The extensive margin of the labor supply
As is shown in many empirical studies (e.g. Meghir and Phillips (2008)), labor
supply is particularly responsive to taxation on its extensive margin (the decision
to participate or not on the labor market). Moreover, theoretical papers have
emphasized that in an optimal redistribution framework without (involuntary) un-
employment, the tax schedule properties are crucially affected by the introduction
of an endogenous extensive margin (Diamond (1980), Saez (2002) and Choné and
Laroque (2005)).
The inclusion of participation responses in HLPV is not satisfying since the
elasticity of participation is infinite at a threshold skill and zero above. Assuming
that the cost of participation varies both within and between skill levels, LPV
provide a much more general treatment of participation. In the classical theory of
unemployment, 8 the employment level is solely determined by labor demand, an
8. Which consists in standard labor-supply and labor demand curves and a wage above the
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unrealistic property according to empirical findings. Conversely, in LPV, both labor
supply and labor demand determine the equilibrium level of employment through
the matching function. LPV show that point i) of Proposition 1 and of Corollary 1
and Corollary 2 hold if the government has a Maximin objective and the elasticity
of participation decreases in skill (the most plausible case according to empirical
evidences, see Juhn et alii (1991), Immervoll et alii (2007) or Meghir and Phillips
(2011). If the government has a more general social objective, no analytical result
can be put forward. However, the numerical simulations in LPV suggest that points
i) of Proposition 1 and of Corollary 1 still hold. The most important difference with
the results of HLPV under a general social objective concerns participation and the
tax schedule. While HLPV show that marginal tax rates are positive everywhere
and a higher transfer to low-skilled workers than to the non-employed is never
optimal (no EITC), a more general treatment of participation decisions appears
to be compatible with negative marginal rates and an EITC for the low skilled.
Thus, upward distortions of the low skilled individuals’ participation rates can be
optimal.
3.3. Inefficiency of the no-tax economy
In order to focus on redistributive issues, our canonical model assumes that
the no-tax economy is efficient. However, this is a very special case since there
is no reason to believe that a decentralized wage setting necessarily maximizes
efficiency. HL build on the framework of HLPV but they do not assume that the
Hosios condition is satisfied. In the case where the bargaining power of workers is
too low, they show that bunching at the bottom of the wage distribution is optimal.
This situation suggests that a binding minimum wage can be optimal.
3.4. Redistribution within skill groups
Unemployment raises an issue that does not appear in a Mirrleesian framework:
the redistribution between employed and unemployed individuals endowed with
the same skill. For simplicity, HLPV neglect this issue by considering an ex-ante
social objective that depends on individuals’ expected utility:
∫ a1
a0
Φ ((wa –T (wa)) ·L (a,wa) +b · (1 –L (a,wa))) · f (a) ·da
market-clearing level.
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where b stands for the welfare benefit. Conversely, one can adopt the ex-post
objective that depends on realized incomes:∫ a1
a0
{L (a,wa) ·Φ (wa –T (wa)) + (1–L (a,wa)) ·Φ (b)} · f (a) ·da
LPV explains that the adoption of the ex-post objective provides an additional mo-
tivation to distort wages downwards: a lower wage reduces the income inequality
between employed and unemployed individuals of the same skill and increases the
number of employed.
3.5. Further research
Finally, we list some potential extensions. First, a dynamic model would enable
to introduce earning-related unemployment insurance. Hence, one can expect
that a “dynamic optimal taxation” version (à la Golosov et alii 2003) of this kind
of model would deliver interesting insights about the optimal combination of
unemployment insurance and taxation to redistribute income. Second, we have
implicitly considered that it is impossible for the government to monitor job-search
activity. This is clearly a strong assumption that should be relaxed. Third, we
abstract from any response of labor supply along the intensive margin. Although
the responses along the extensive margin seem empirically much more important,
enriching the framework to include hours of work, in-work effort or educational
investment would be interesting. Finally, labor supply decisions are often taken at
the household level, not at the individual level (see Kleven et alii 2009). An optimal
redistributive theory incorporating this issue would thus be more comprehensive.
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